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$EVWUDFW  This paper investigates the impact of tax policy on international depositing.
Non-bank international deposits are shown to be positively related to interest income and
wealth taxes and to the presence of domestic bank interest reporting. This suggests that
international deposits are in part intended to facilitate tax evasion. The tax sensitivity of
international deposits is estimated to be higher in 1999 than before. At present, only part
of international interest flow are covered by either non-resident interest withholding taxes
or international exchange of information. This incomplete coverage may be a reason that
these policies currently appear to have little impact on international depositing.
                                                
* The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely
those of the authors. They should not be attributed to the European Commission.45
 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Countries typically tax the worldwide interest income of their residents. By now,
the tax authorities in most OECD countries require domestic banks to report interest
payments to domestic residents. In contrast, no comprehensive system of international
exchange of bank interest information exists to date. This, combined with the generally
low taxation of international bank interest at source, implies that the international
recipient of bank interest can evade all taxation of this income with relative ease. In the
minds of European policy makers, this has been a serious problem since at least the
1980s, as evidenced by the introduction in 1989 of a first proposal for a European
directive towards a common minimum withholding tax on interest. In 1998, a second
proposal for a directive was published that gave EU member states the option to tax
interest accruing to non-residents at source or to exchange information with other
countries. At a recent European Council meeting in November 2000, the European Union
has agreed that from 2010 onwards international information exchange will be the
mechanism to shore up the taxation of international interest flows. Until then, several
countries, namely Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, will be free to levy a minimum
withholding tax instead, with the understanding that 75 percent of the tax revenues are
passed on to the residence-country tax authorities. This set of policy intentions is to be
laid down in a binding directive by the end of 2002, on the condition that the European
Union reaches agreement with several third countries, notably Switzerland, on the
adoption of similar anti-evasion measures in these countries.
The adoption of a directive in the area of international interest taxation would be
the first major international agreement in the area of capital income taxation, or for that
matter of direct taxation in general. The further development of policy in this area (to
include, say, countries outside the EU, or to extend coverage to dividends) is hampered
by a lack of empirical analysis of international interest tax evasion.  A main impediment
to research in this area has been the limited data on the international ownership of bank
deposits and other financial assets. Countries are presumably restricting access to this
data to protect the employment and profits of their domestic banking sectors.  More
discussion at the international level of the potential roles of banks in tax evasion and
money laundering schemes may some day force more openness, but for now data on6
bilateral banking flows remains confidential. Data of this kind, however, is collected by
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and has been made available for this study
on the condition that data on bilateral banking flows is not disclosed.
The main purpose of this paper is to see to what extent international banking
flows reflect tax policy and efforts to enforce it. Tax determinants first are the residence-
based interest income and wealth taxes that GHMXUH typically apply to worldwide income
and wealth. To aid enforcement, many countries by now require their banks to report
interest payments to domestic residents to the tax authorities. To enable international
enforcement, banking countries in some instances also supply information to foreign tax
authorities. Data on both types of information provision have been collected for this
paper. Finally, the analysis also takes into account that international interest payments
may be subject to an interest withholding tax in the source country.
Our empirical results suggest that high income and wealth taxes elicit
international depositing. Domestic interest reporting also appears to contribute to
international bank placements. There is less evidence that interest withholding taxes
discourage such depositing. Possible reasons are that non-resident withholding taxes are
typically at rather low levels and imposed by relatively few countries. Similarly, there is
little evidence that international information exchange – for 1999 data – has a strong
impact on bilateral depositing. Again, a reason may be the haphazard pattern of
international information exchange at present. Truly generalized withholding taxes or
information exchange in principle affects the international depositing decision as much as
domestic tax policy, and hence can be expected to have a significant impact on
international depositing patterns.
Several authors have previously examined the determinants of international
banking flows. Grilli (1989) relates non-bank and inter-bank deposits to interest and
dividend taxes, capital flows, an index of bank secrecy, GNP, and a trend. He finds that
non-bank deposits are influenced by taxes on interest and by bank secrecy, while inter-
bank deposits are driven by the size of the source economy and by the taxation of
dividends (suggesting that bank accounts might be used to park money meant for later
financial transactions). Alworth and Andresen (1992) further estimate a gravity model to7
explain the determinants of  non-bank bilateral deposit flows using data up to 1990.
1
These authors include several bank-system variables such as the (bilateral) difference in
reserve requirements, the bank-country interest withholding tax, and an index of its bank
secrecy. The withholding tax and bank secrecy variables, as part of interacted variables,
are shown to be determinants of cross-border deposits. More recently, Fornari and Levy
(2000) have estimated the determinants of bilateral cross-border deposits inflows for a
group of 6 industrialized countries. These authors place special emphasis on financial
structure variables such the stock market capitalization to GDP, stock market volatility
differences and the trading volume of the stock market. As Alworth and Andresen
(1992), the present paper examines the determinants of non-bank bilateral international
depositing with a focus on taxation. This paper differs, however, in that we have
somewhat more detailed information on the tax regime and the availability of bank
information to tax authorities. In particular, the present paper includes personal interest
income and wealth taxes and distinguishes between the domestic and international
availability of bank information to tax authorities.
Several theoretical papers have also examined tax policy towards mobile financial
capital. Janeba and Peters (1999), for instance, consider the issue of discrimination
against internationally mobile capital given that countries set tax rates non-cooperatively.
Huizinga and Nielsen (2000a) show that an internationally agreed minimum withholding
tax on interest, that is only binding for a small country, can benefit all countries, if in fact
all countries are induced to increase their interest tax rates. Bacchetta and Espinosa
(1995) argue that it may be in a country’s own interest to provide information about bank
interest payments to non-residents, as this enables the interest-receiving country to
increase its own income tax rate. This in turn reduces the incentive for residents of the
information-providing country to place their savings abroad. In a repeated game
framework, Bacchetta and Espinoza (2000) further study the joint determination of taxes
on international investment income and information-exchange clauses in double taxation
                                                
1  Recently, several papers have also applied the gravity approach to investigate capital flows other
than cross-border deposits. Portes and Rey (1999), for instance, show that bilateral portfolio equity
investments reflect variables proxying (private) information availability, such as international telephone
calls and multinational bank branches. Along similar lines, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000) find that
U.S. holdings of a country’s equities are positively related to the share of that country’s stock market that is8
treaties. They find that information exchange may be part of a (sustainable) tax treaty if
there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, or with one-
way capital flows. Also in a repeated game setting, Huizinga and Nielsen (2000b)
examine countries’ exclusive choice between non-resident withholding taxes and
information exchange (as provided for by the European Commission’s draft directive of
1998). Two countries choosing the same regime (either withholding taxes or information
exchange) and a mixed regime (one country choosing withholding taxes and the other
information exchange) are all possible equilibria of the regime selection game.
Information exchange performs relatively well, and is more likely to be chosen in
equilibrium, if governments apply a relatively low discount rate to future outcomes. In
the following, section 2 discusses the data used in this study. Section 3 presents the
empirical results, and section 4 concludes.
 7KHGDWD
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDOGHSRVLWV
The BIS has collected data on the external liabilities of reporting country banking
systems since 1983, and on external deposits in 1996. The external liabilities and deposits
of BIS reporting countries for 1999 are reported in Table 1. These figures represent all
currencies. From the table, we see that the UK and the US have the largest external
liabilities at ¼WULOOLRQDQG¼WULOOLRQrespectively. Among the smaller countries, the
Cayman Islands and Switzerland have about ¼WULOOLRQLQforeign liabilities, while
Luxembourg has around ¼WULOOLRQThe total external liabilities of banks in the BIS
area amount to ¼WULOOLRQ7RWDOliabilities are divided between bank and non-bank
liabilities. As seen in the second column, non-bank liabilities are less than half of total
liabilities in all reporting countries. For the BIS area, non-bank liabilities stand at 24
percent of total liabilities. Interestingly, non-bank liabilities are highest in Switzerland
and the Cayman Islands at 48 and 42 percent of total liabilities, respectively. External
deposits are represented in the third column. External deposits are shown to be the lion’s
share of external liabilities. For the BIS area as a whole, external deposits are 92 percent
                                                                                                                                                
listed on U.S. exchanges. This is attributed to the fact that a listing in the U.S. lowers information costs for
U.S. investors.9
of external liabilities. The last column indicates that non-bank external deposits are 25
percent of total external deposits.
It is also interesting to consider to what extent a country’s residents maintain
deposits abroad. To proceed, let GLMbe the deposits in country Lowned by the residents of
county M We can now define country M’s exports of deposits  (as part of capital exports) or







To see how important these deposit exports and imports are, we can relate them to
the total deposits in a country’s banking system and to the ownership of deposits by a
country’s residents. Specifically, let 'L be the total deposits in country L’s banking
system. The worldwide ownership of deposits by residents of country L then can be
defined as 2L 'L(L±,LThe share of deposits owned by residents of country L held
abroad is given by  L V =  L L 2 ( / . Net deposit imports cause a country’s banking system to
be larger that it would otherwise be. We can define the expansion rate of a country’s
banking system on account of its net deposit imports as  L J =  L L L 2 ( , / ) ( - . This
expansion is measured relative to the hypothetical case where the banking system exactly
accommodates the deposits owned by the country’s residents. The expansion rate is a
rough index of how much a particular banking system gains or loses on account of its net
deposit imports.
Table 2 provides data on aggregate deposit exports and imports and other derived
variables for 1998.
2 Switzerland and the United Kingdom are shown to be net exporters
of deposits (bank and non-bank deposits together) from the first 2 columns, while they
are net importers of non-bank deposits from the last 2 columns. Net inflows of non-bank
deposits thus are more than off-set by net outflows of bank deposits. At any rate,
incoming non-bank deposits are recycled as outgoing bank deposits. Conversely, the
United States is a net exporter of non-bank deposits, and a net importer of bank deposits
(as net exports of non-bank deposits exceed net exports of overall deposits). Other net10
exporters of non-bank deposits are Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, and Spain.
Next, we turn to the share of deposits owned by residents held abroad. Here Switzerland
leads with 88 percent, which reflects the high gross exports of deposits from Switzerland.
Australia, Canada, and Norway have foreign shares of the deposit ownership at less than
20 percent, reflecting relatively closed banking systems. Finally, we consider the
expansion rate of the banking system due to net deposit imports. Canada and Germany
are shown to have net deposit imports that exceed 10 percent of deposit ownership.
Switzerland is a large net deposit exporter, and on the basis of this is calculated to have a
banking system ‘expansion’ rate of  –38 percent. To increase the national coverage
somewhat, Table 3 provides information on exports and imports of bank liabilities rather
than bank deposits.  Hong Kong registers as an additional net exporter of non-bank
liabilities, while the Bahamas is shown to be a strong net importer of non-bank liabilities.
 7KHWD[V\VWHP
Countries typically tax different types or income at different rates. Since 1983,
increasingly many countries have opted for dual tax systems with different tax rates for
earned and capital income. Capital income may again be taxed differently depending on
whether it takes the form of interest, dividends, or capital gains. In practice, even finer
gradations are found (especially with respect to international capital income flows) where
separate rates of tax are applied to bond interest, bank interest, or interest from a loan
secured by real estate. Wealth taxes tend to be less specific, although some countries
make distinctions between taxes on financial wealth (which could be divided into
portfolio wealth or business ownership), and real estate. Throughout, we have attempted
to identify the taxation of interest from deposits and wealth in the form of deposits as
regards individuals.
Table 4 provides the effective interest income and wealth taxes applied to bank
deposits in 1999 in most BIS reporting countries. Both taxes generally apply to
worldwide interest income and wealth, and take into account sub-national taxation of
interest in several cases, such as Canada and Denmark. In 1999, Austria, Belgium,
                                                                                                                                                
2  We chose 1998 as the total banking system deposits published for 1999 by euro-area countries
include shares in money market funds.11
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom maintained dual (or multiple) income tax systems with a relatively low tax rate
for interest income. In all these cases, the dual income tax system was introduced during
the 1983-1999 period. These introductions were probably at least in part meant to reduce
the incentive to evade the taxation of domestic capital income such as interest income
3.
Since 1983, the average interest income tax has declined gradually as seen in Figure 1.
The decline took place during a period of  liberalization of capital movements.
Table 4 also provides information about wealth taxes in place in 1999. Since
1983, several countries have eliminated their wealth taxes (Austria’s ended by 1994,
Denmark’s by 1997, and Germany’s by 1997). France relinquished its ‘old’ wealth tax by
1986, to introduce a ‘new’ wealth tax in 1988. Overall, the average wealth tax has
declined significantly since 1983 (see Figure 2). Finally, we turn to non-resident interest
withholding taxes, as given in Table 5.
4 In 1999, only 4 countries in the table levy
positive withholding taxes on any outgoing bank interest flows. This reflect that bank
interest is often favored over other types of interest. The U.S., for instance, has
maintained a statutory exemption for bank interest throughout the period under
consideration, even though it levied a non-resident (non-treaty) interest withholding tax
of 30 applied to, say, Eurobond interest till the late 1980s. The U.K. similarly exempts
bank interest on bank claims with a maturity of less than a year including regular current
account and savings account deposits. Switzerland is a major financial center that
continues to tax the bank interest accruing to non-residents, even though also this country
has reduced the non-treaty tax rate of 35 percent to 12.5 percent or less in all but 5 cases
in the table. Austria and France are among the countries that have abolished non-resident
withholding taxes in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Overall, the average nonresident
interest withholding tax has declined since 1983, as seen in Figure 3.
                                                
3  Recent tax reforms continue the movement away from synthetic income tax systems. At the start
of 2001, the Netherlands also introduced a dual system with a tax rate of 30 percent on a (deemed) return
on capital income of 4 percent. This amounts to a wealth tax of 1.2 percent per annum to replace the
previous wealth tax of 0.7 percent.
4  See also Zee (1998) for an exposition of the role of withholding taxes in taxing international
portfolio income.12
 $FFHVVWREDQNLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQH[FKDQJH
Taxes on bank interest that are not withheld by the paying bank have to be
collected from the depositor. To make enforcement  in this case realistic, the tax authority
needs to have independent access to bank information. Access to bank information for tax
purposes, either domestic or international, has been far from straightforward, as
documented in a comprehensive recent report by the OECD (2000). A first requirement is
that the banks themselves maintain the information that is required for tax enforcement
and that they do not open anonymous or numbered accounts. As indicated by OECD
(2000), the vast majority of OECD tax authorities can obtain bank information to combat
domestic tax evasion. Information provision – either domestic or international – can be
categorized as spontaneous (on the initiative of the information provider), on request, or
automatic. Tax authorities that request specific account information have to follow due
procedures – administrative or legal – to make the request. To make specific requests, tax
authorities need to already have some specific information on which to base the request.
Information provided on request is thus not likely to lead to across-the-board tax
enforcement.
This leaves the automatic and periodic provision of bank information as the only
viable way to enforce taxation. As seen in OECD (2000, Appendix 1) 15 OECD countries
require their banks to generally report ‘interest paid and to whom it is paid’. These
countries were requested to indicate when they started to require their domestic banks to
automatically report interest payments to domestic residents. The answers received are
reflected in Table 6. As seen in the table, during the 1980s and early 1990s several
countries additionally required domestic interest reporting. By 1999 about two thirds of
the countries required automatic domestic information provisioning regarding interest
payments.
International automatic information exchange requires some international legal
agreement – in addition to domestic regulation. The legal basis can be a bilateral tax
treaty, which in many cases is modeled after the OECD Model Convention on Income
and Capital. Article 26 of this convention requires contracting States to ‘exchange such
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the
domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the Convention13
insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention’. All OECD members
except Luxembourg and Switzerland can obtain bank information for the purpose of
exchange of information under tax treaties as set out in the Model Convention.
5 Several
multilateral agreements that can serve as a basis for information exchange exist as well.
For instance, the European Union has adopted several directives that enable member
states to exchange information within the EU on direct and indirect tax matters.
6 The
joint OECD/ Council of Europe Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters, which has been ratified by 8 countries (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United States), also permits countries
to exchange information on direct and indirect tax matters. Finally, the Nordic
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters allows the Nordic
countries to exchange bank and other information for all kinds of taxes except import
duties. Unlike the other multilateral agreements, the Nordic Convention calls for the
automatic exchange of bank information.
In its survey, the OECD found that 11 members (Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, the United
States) provided bank information automatically to (some) treaty partners.  We  requested
these countries to provide additional information about their recipient countries and the
history of this automatic information exchange. Table 7 summarizes the resulting data
about the history of bilateral information exchange. Several countries (Australia, Finland,
and Norway) mentioned their treaty partners as recipients, but more generally countries
supply information automatically to a more selective and changing list of countries. The
OECD report mentions that Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden
exchange bank information automatically based in part on reciprocity. As recipient lists
of countries vary from year to year and institutional memories are short, it is impossible
to construct an accurate history of bilateral automatic information exchange.
On the basis of survey responses, however, one can get a relatively complete
picture of automatic information exchange in the BIS-area for 1999 (see Table  8 ). From
the table, we can see to what extent information exchange in practice occurs on the basis
                                                
5  Countries that agree to exchange information automatically typically do not write this into their
bilateral tax treaty, but instead conclude a separate memorandum of understanding.14
of reciprocity. Specifically, in the table there are 288 unidirectional entries for which we
also know whether information flows in the other direction. Of these, 67 entries signal the
presence of international information exchange. Of these 67 entries, 30 one-way
exchanges are reciprocated (i.e. there are 15 pairs of bilateral information exchange). To
measure the degree of reciprocity, we constructed 2 dummy variables, each indicating the
presence or absence of information flows in one direction. The correlation coefficient
between these two dummy variables is found to be 0.28 and to be significant at the 1
percent level. This is evidence of reciprocity of information exchange.
A separate issue is whether information exchange, as reflected in Table 8, and
withholding taxes, as reflected in Table 5, are complements or substitutes. To investigate
this, we note that there are 440 entries in either table for which we know whether there is
information exchange as well as the relevant withholding tax rate. Breaking down these
440 entries, we find there are 68 entries with only information exchange, 51 entries with
only a withholding tax, 17 entries with both, and finally 304 entries with neither. The 17
entries with joint information exchange and withholding taxation all pertain to Australia
(as a bank country). Apart from Australia, information exchange and withholding taxes
thus are substitutes rather than complements.
 (PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
This section examines the empirical relationship between tax policy and the
external liabilities of the banking system. As our main interest is in tax policy at the
personal level, we only consider non-bank external liabilities and deposits. Following
Alworth and Andresen (1992), we use BIS data on bilateral external liabilities and
deposits. Bilateral data is preferred as this allows us to include tax and other information
concerning the bank country, the customer country, and their bilateral relationship. The
regression analysis starts from the following estimating equation:
LMW LMW LM MW M LW L LMW ; ; ; , e b b b a + + + + = 0
                                                                                                                                                
6  In particular, see directives 77/799/EEC, 79/1070/EEC, and 92/12/EEC.15
where ,LMW is the independent variable denoting funds held in country L’s banks by non-
bank residents of county M (either QRQEDQN H[WHUQDO OLDELOLWLHV or QRQEDQN H[WHUQDO
GHSRVLWV); next, ;LW are bank country variables (e.g., UHDO*'3), ;MW are customer country
variables (e.g., the ZHDOWKWD[), and ;LMW are characteristics of the bilateral relationship
between the bank and the customer countries (e.g., GLVWDQFH). The vector ;LW￿ only contains
non-tax-policy controls, while the vectors ;MW￿￿and ;LMW contain tax policy variables as well
as controls. Further, a0 is a constant,  the b's are vectors of coefficients, and eLMW is an error
term. Finally, several regressions include  year dummy variables to capture time-specific
effects, and country dummies to capture specific effects related to the bank and customer
countries.
The regressions reported in Table 9 use pooled cross-section time series data. The
dependent variable regressions in (1)-(3) is QRQEDQNH[WHUQDOOLDELOLWLHV covering the
period 1983-1999. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) instead is QRQEDQN
H[WHUQDOGHSRVLWV for the period 1996-1999. Unreported year dummies are included in all
regressions. In addition, regressions (2), (3), (5) and (6) include unreported bank-country
dummies, while regressions (3) and (6) further include customer-country dummies. In all
regressions, non-tax control variables include each country’s UHDO*'3, its EDQNLQWHUHVW
VSUHDG, its degree of UXOHRIODZ, and dummy variables identifying the origin of each
country’s legal system. %DQN LQWHUHVW VSUHDG is a measure of the spread between a
banking system’s lending and deposit interest rates, and serves as an index of bank
efficiency. Systems with low interest spreads are attractive to bank customers, and hence
savers in countries with relatively inefficient banks are expected to take their deposits to
countries with relatively efficient banks. Several estimated coefficients on the two EDQN
LQWHUHVWVSUHDGvariables in the table are statistically significant and consistent with this.
Variables identifying legal system origin are included following research by La
Porta et al. (1997) showing that the outside equity and debt finance raised by firms
depends importantly on the legal system. These authors distinguish legal systems of
English, French, German and Scandinavian origins. The regressions in the table include
dummy variables denoting only the three latter types of system. Negative estimated
coefficients for these legal origin variables - for bank and customer countries alike -
suggest that parties in countries with non-English legal traditions participate less in16
international depositing. Control variables characterizing the bilateral relationship
between bank and customer country include two international trade variables, and the
GLVWDQFH, FRQWLJXLW\, and FRPPRQODQJXDJHvariables. More intense international trade, a
smaller distance, geographical contiguity and a common language are expected to
contribute to external bank liabilities. The estimated coefficients in the table largely
confirm these expectations.
Turning to tax policy, the LQFRPHWD[[GHSRVLWUDWHvariable is constructed as the
customer-country income tax rate times its deposit interest rate. This variable measures
the interest tax burden that the bank customer faces if he were to deposit at home.  In
columns (1) and (3),  this tax variable obtains positive and significant coefficients. The
estimate of 0.043 in column (2) implies that a 1 percent increase in the interest tax burden
would cause a relatively modest increase in external bank liabilities of 4.3 percent. Next,
the ZHDOWKWD[ variable simply is the wealth tax rate. It enters columns (2), (4), and (5)
with positive and significant coefficients. Note that the estimated coefficient on the
wealth tax in column (2) is about 4 times as large as the coefficient for the income tax
variable. Bank customers subject to the wealth tax no doubt are relatively wealthy, and
perhaps have been more prone to place funds abroad to evade domestic taxation. The
final indicator of customer-country tax policy is the GRPHVWLFLQIRUPDWLRQvariable. This
is a dummy variable flagging the existence of automatic interest information provisioning
to domestic tax authorities. This variable enters columns (1)-(3) with positive and
significant coefficients. The estimated coefficient of 0.247 in column (3) suggests that
such domestic information provisioning increases external bank placements by 28
percent.
Next, we turn to bank-country tax policy. :LWKKROGLQJ WD[ [ GHSRVLW UDWH is
constructed as the non-resident interest withholding tax levied by the bank country times
this country’s deposit interest rate. This variable thus measures the withholding tax
burden the international bank customer faces in the bank country.  This variable enters all
regressions in the table with negative coefficients, but only significantly in column (1).
This reflects that the inclusion of bank country dummies in column (2) suffices to render17
the coefficient on the withholding tax variable insignificant. This is not very surprising
given that most of the variation in the withholding tax rate is across bank country.
7
The non-resident interest withholding tax presumably affects a saver’s choice of
foreign bank location as much as the more fundamental choice of whether to bank abroad
at all. Hence, estimated coefficients on the withholding tax variable may mostly reflect
savers’ substitutions among various international banking destinations. Regressions with
bilateral data thus cannot tell us directly how aggregate foreign banking would respond if
all countries were to raise their withholding taxes (or alternatively were to exchange
information). A priori, however, the response should be similar to that following an
equal-sized reduction in the domestic tax burden on bank holdings. The reason is the
foreign banking trade-off depends on the net tax savings that can be achieved by banking
abroad. This net benefit is affected equally by an increase in foreign taxes and a reduction
in domestic taxes. Our empirical results, as discussed, suggest that the foreign banking
response to domestic taxation is considerable, and hence the response to a comprehensive
increase in effective international taxation should be significant as well.
Next, we turn to a set of largely similar regressions with data for 1999 as
represented in Table 10. This is the most recent year for which data is available, and of
course the first year after the introduction of the euro. The focus on 1999 allows the
inclusion of the additional LQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ variable signaling the international
exchange of interest information on a bilateral basis. The regressions in Table 10 do not
include the international trade variables, as this would reduce the sample size by half. In
column (2), we see that the estimated coefficient on the LQFRPHWD[[GHSRVLWUDWH variable
is 1.461, much larger than the corresponding estimate of 0.043 in Table 10. The figure of
1.461 suggests that a 1 percent increase in the domestic interest tax burden causes foreign
placements to rise by 146 percent. To interpret this, note that a 1 percent rise in the
interest tax burden requires an income tax rate increase of 20 percent if the deposit
interest rate is 5 percent. Outward-bound deposits typically are only a fraction of the
domestic deposit base (for instance, deposit exports are 8 percent of total banking system
deposits for Norway in 1998, as calculated from data in Table 2). This implies that the
                                                
7  Eijffinger, Huizinga and Lemmen (1998) have previously shown empirically that non-resident
withholding taxes are positively related to government debt yields.18
percentage reduction in domestic banking system deposits is generally far less than the
percentage increase in external deposits (if we assume a one-for-one substitution). All the
same, the estimated foreign banking response to domestic taxation for 1999 is sizeable.
The estimated coefficients for the ZHDOWKWD[ variable is 1.087 in column (2) of
Table 10, which is also far more than the corresponding estimate of 0.190 in column (2)
of Table 9. Note that the estimated coefficients on the income and wealth tax variables
are of comparable size in columns (2) and (5) of Table 10. The most recent data thus
suggest that the income and wealth tax burdens have a comparable impact on foreign
bank placements. The remaining tax policy variables are the GRPHVWLFLQIRUPDWLRQ and
LQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ variables and the ZLWKKROGLQJWD[variableAll three variables
fail to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level in any of the regression reported in
Table 10. One reason may be that by 1999 domestic information provision and zero
withholding taxes have become the norm so that the associated variables display
relatively little variation in 1999.
The LQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ variable further may not prove to be significant if
the exchange of information, as currently organized, fails to bring about an effective tax
enforcement. Also, international information exchange will not have a noticeable effect,
if savers by 1999 do not recognize that tax authorities ‘automatically’ swap information
about particular international interest payments. At the same time, by 1999 international
information  exchange was far from comprehensive so that savers continued to have
access to ‘trusted’ foreign banking systems with strong reputations for bank secrecy.
Continued access of this type of foreign banking could make information exchange by
any subset of countries ineffectual.
 &RQFOXVLRQ
This paper has investigated the impact of tax policy on international depositing.
The empirical results indicate that external deposits are positively related to interest
income and wealth taxes, and to the presence of domestic bank interest reporting. This is
evidence that international deposits are in part intended to facilitate tax evasion. The tax
sensitivity of international deposits appears to be higher in 1999 than before. This is to be
expected, as advances in ICT have reduced the costs of international banking. People also19
have become wealthier so that any fixed costs of setting up foreign bank accounts are
more easily overcome. Perhaps in response to increased tax sensitivities, countries have
substantially reduced the taxation of interest income in the last two decades. In fact, the
average interest income tax, financial wealth tax, and non-resident interest withholding
tax all have been almost halved since 1983. In several countries, this has taken the form
of dual income tax regimes with a reduced taxation of interest and other capital income.
As interest withholding taxes have been reduced or eliminated, the international
exchange of information becomes potentially more important to ensure a reasonable
taxation of international interest flows. A simple count of bilateral international
relationships reveals that by 1999 the automatic exchange of information is already as
prominent as withholding taxes. Doubts, however, remain about its effectiveness at
present. Some common protocol regarding tax identification numbers, for instance, still
needs to be enacted to boost effectiveness. Also, the international exchange of
information has to cover most industrialized countries and other financial centers to be
truly effective. All this implies that international cooperation is necessary to shore up the
taxation of international interest flows. EU member states have stated their intention in
November 2000 to make information exchange the main mechanism to ensure interest
taxation internationally by 2010. Actual implementation, however, has been made
conditional on whether sufficient cooperation with several non-EU financial centers – in
the eyes of EU member states – can be achieved.20
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$SSHQGL[$9DULDEOHGHILQLWLRQVDQGVRXUFHV
([WHUQDOEDQNOLDELOLW\DQGGHSRVLWGDWD
Bilateral data on total and non-bank external liabilities and deposits are for all currencies.
In the regressions, non-bank external liabilities and non-bank external deposits are in real
ecus or euros and in logs. Total deposits in the banking system in Table 2 is the sum of
demand and other deposits (lines 24 and 25 of the ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO6WDWLVWLFV of the
IMF).
7D[DWLRQDQGEDQNLQIRUPDWLRQYDULDEOHV
,QFRPHWD[[GHSRVLWUDWH = income tax rate (between 0 and 100) times the deposit interest
rate (between 0 and 1) in the bank customer country
:HDOWKWD[ = wealth tax is the wealth tax applicable to financial assets (between 0 and
100)
:LWKKROGLQJ WD[  [ GHSRVLW UDWH = non-resident interest withholding tax on interest
(between 0 and 100) times the deposit interest rate (between 0 and 1) in the bank
country
'RPHVWLF LQIRUPDWLRQ = dummy signaling automatic reporting by banks of interest
payments to domestic residents
,QWHUQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ = dummy signaling the international exchange of information
on bank interest payments
The taxation variables are from ,QWHUQDWLRQDO WD[ VXPPDULHV (Coopers & Lybrand),
,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[HVDZRUOGZLGHVXPPDU\(PriceWaterhouseCoopers),
and the (XURSHDQ WD[ KDQGERRN (International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation).
Information on whether there recently has been domestic interest reporting by banks and
any automatic exchange of information on international bank interest payments is taken
from OECD (2000). Information on when automatic domestic reporting by banks started
(in Table 6) and to what countries and since when bank interest information is provided
automatically (in Tables 7) has been obtained from national authorities. The deposit
interest rate is line 60l of the ,QWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDOVWDWLVWLFVof the IMF.
2WKHUYDULDEOHV
5HDO*'3 = log of GDP in real ecus or euros
%DQNLQWHUHVWVSUHDG = log of ratio of bank lending and deposit interest rates
5XOHRIODZ= assessment of the law and order tradition in a country. Scale from 0 to 10
)UHQFKODZ  dummy identifying French legal origin
*HUPDQODZ = dummy identifying German legal origin
6FDQGLQDYLDQODZ dummy identifying Scandinavian legal origin
%DQNFRXQWU\H[SRUWV = log of exports from bank country to customer country in real ecus
or euros
&XVWRPHUFRXQWU\H[SRUWV = log of exports from customer country to bank country in real
ecus or euros23
'LVWDQFH = distance in kilometers from capital to capital
&RQWLJXLW\ = dummy identifying a common border
&RPPRQODQJXDJH = dummy identifying common language
Data on GDPs and trade are from Eurostat and the IMF. The lending interest rate is line
60p of the ,QWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDOVWDWLVWLFV of the IMF. Information on rule of law and
legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1997). Data on distance, contiguity, and common
language are from WorldAtlas.com (2000) and Phensel (2000).24
Table 1. External liabilities and deposits of banks in the BIS-area in 1999
External liabilities External deposits
¼EQ % non-bank ¼EQ % non-bank
Australia 146 8 47 26
A u s t r i a 8 01 26 51 5
Bahamas 225 33 224 33
Bahrein 82 31 82              31
Belgium 272 31 261              28
Canada 100 32 95 34
Cayman Islands 604 42 597 43
D e n m a r k 5 61 54 61 8
F i n l a n d 2 22 01 23 5
France 611 9 472 12
Germany 819 32 719 37
Hong Kong 349 23 348 23
Ireland 129 19 126 19
Italy 233 7 232 7
Japan 509 6 502 6
Luxembourg 371 37 319 37
Netherlands 288 18 240 22
N o r w a y 2 591 5 1 2
Portugal 65 17 55 13
Singapore 393 29 361 32
Spain 184 39 177 40
Sweden 72 13 53 10
Switzerland 560 48 560 48
United Kingdom 1,778 21 1,626 21
United States 1,035 9 1,035 13
O t h e r 2 43 02 43 0
Total 9,031 24 8,292 25
Source: BIS (2000), Tables 2A, 2B,3A, and 3B and own calculations25









































Australia 16 18 203 202 8 1 6 3
Austria 37 43 6 6
Bahamas 124 147
Belgium 154 185 13 30
Canada 45 75 317 287 16 11 14 15
D e n m a r k 3 33 68 68 34 0 3 35
Finland 17 9 53 61 28 -14 1 1
France 288 326 41 34
Germany 337 494 1,267 1,110 30 14 87 97
Ireland 58 91 19 19
Italy 155 173 457 438 35 4 41 17
Japan 348 364 36 14
Netherlands 254 202
Norway 6 10 72 69 9 5 2 1
Portugal 29 30 87 85 34 2 5 5
Spain 112 108 317 321 35 -1 46 18
Sweden 31 57 4 12
Switzerland 459 261 325 523 88 -38 42 93
United 1,035 1,024 86 23726
Kingdom
United States 656 541 2,291 2,406 27 -5 228 31
For data sources see Appendix A. Note that exports and imports are calculated using only data from those countries for which imports
are available.27
Table 3. Summary statistics on external liabilities in 1998














Australia 22 74 7 3
Austria 38 45 6 6
Bahamas 129 157 10 59
Bahrain 25 35 2 3
Belgium 157 200 13 41
Canada 48 81 15 18
Denmark 38 37 3 5
F i n l a n d 1 7 911
France 313 348 41 35
Germany 352 512 89 97
Hong Kong 258 294 23 14
I r e l a n d 5 99 21 91 9
Italy 158 177 41 17
Japan 653 545 40 15
Netherlands 268 209
N o r w a y 71 02 1
Portugal 29 40 5 8
Singapore 216 251
Spain 113 109 47 18
Sweden 32 58 5 12
Switzerland 463 277 42 98
United
Kingdom
1,129 1,098 97 243
United States 709 572 234 34
For data sources see Appendix A. Note that exports and imports are calculated using
only data from those countries for which imports are available.28





































United Kingdom 40 0
United States
18 39.6 0
For data sources see Appendix A
                                                
8             Final withholding tax or top marginal tax rate.
9             Ontario.
10            Copenhagen. Sum of basic rate, surcharges, and local and church taxes.
11            Helsinki.
12            Including social surcharge and generalized social tax.
13            Including solidarity surcharge.
14            Tokyo. Including local taxes.
15            Sum of 0.4% national tax  plus 0.7% local tax.
16            Including regional tax.
17            Bern, including cantonal and municipal wealth tax.
18 Federal  tax  only.2930
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3RUWXJDO 20 10 20 20 15 20 20 20 15 12 15 20 20 15 15 20 20 20 20 15 x 15 20 10 10 10
6SDLQ 000000000000000000000x0000
6ZHGHQ 0000000000000000000000x000
6ZLW]HUODQG 1 053 5 3 5 1 0 1 0 3 50 0 0 01 0 3 50 1 2 , 5 1 0 1 053 501 0 1 05 x 0 5
8￿￿.LQJGRP 000000000000000000000000 x 0
8QLWHG￿6WDWHV 0000000000000000000000000 x
For data sources see Appendix A. Where different rates apply to foreign currency deposits, the lowest rate is given.31





















United Kingdom Yes 52
United States Yes
For data sources see Appendix A32
Table 7. International automatic exchange of information on bank interest payments
)URP 7R 6LQFH
Australia Treaty partners About 95
Austria None
Belgium None
Canada U.S at least
Denmark
19 Differing countries 1993
Finland














Sweden Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, US








                                                
19 In 1998 and 1999, Denmark provided info to Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Faeroe Islands, Finland,
France,  Greenland, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, US.
20 Main recipients have been Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Poland, Sweden, UK, US.
21 In 1999, France provided information to Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, UK, US.33
United States Canada 1997
For data sources see Appendix A34













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Contiguity .005 .083 .397** -.124 .022 .24437



























Adj. R² .72 .82 .84 .70 .82 .83
No. of obs 2375 2375 2375 757 757 757
Data on liabilities is for 1983-1999, while data on deposits is for 1996-1999. All
regressions include unreported time dummies. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)
include bank country dummies, while columns (3) and (6) in addition contain
customer country dummies.  Detailed variable definitions and data sources are
given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent errors are given in
parentheses.
 * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.38





















































































































































































Adj. R² .59 .71 .74 .59 .71 .73
No. of obs 203 203 203 203 203 203
All regressions include unreported time dummies. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)
include bank country dummies, while columns (3) and (6) in addition contain
customer country dummies. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are
given in Appendix A.
Heteroskedasticity consistent errors are given in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.40









1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
￿
Note. For countries listed in Table 5. For data sources see Appendix A











1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
￿
Note. For countries listed in Table 5. For data sources see Appendix A41
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Note. For countries listed in Table 5. For data sources see Appendix A42
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